Using unique analyst location data for 11,633 analysts located in 45 countries covering 17,353 firms around the world, we construct both ex-ante and ex-post optimism measures to explore the factors that influence analyst target price optimism. We find that target price optimism is positively associated with proxies for analysts' conflicts of interest, but negatively associated with country-level institutional infrastructure as characterised by strong investor protection, effective legal enforcement and transparent financial environment. Our results highlight the importance of institutional infrastructure of a country in disciplining analysts from biased research.
Target prices convey sell-side analysts' assessments of the future value of underlying stocks. In recent years, analysts have increasingly issued target prices alongside earnings forecasts and stock recommendations in their equity research reports. The credibility and usefulness of target prices, however, has long been questioned. Despite occasional successes at predicting prices, 1 . To the best of our knowledge, however, we are not aware of any studies that systematically examine the determinants of target price optimism.
In this paper, we examine target price optimism in an international context to explore factors that influence analyst forecast optimism. Using a unique analyst-location data for 17,353 firms covered by 11,633 analysts located in 45 countries, we find that analyst optimism in target prices is exacerbated by analysts' conflicts of interest and external financing needs of the target firms. We also find that analysts in countries with good institutional infrastructure as characterized by strong investor protection, effective 1 One example of target price hits is Henry Blodget's famous $400 target for Amazon.com in 1998. On December 16, 1998, Henry Blodget issued a target price of $400 per share for Amazon.com when the stock closed at $242.75 in the previous day. The stock rose over 19% that day, and blew through the $400 price target in about three weeks. 2 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/05/business/market-watch- price-targets-are-hazardous-to-investors-wealth.html? pagewanted=all&src=pm. 3 See for example Bandyopadhyay, Brown, and Richardson (1995) ; Bradshaw (2002) ; Brav and Lehavy (2003) ; Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) ; Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2008); Huang, Mian, and Sankaraguruswamy (2009); Da and Schaumburg (2011); and Da, Hong, and Lee (2010) .
legal enforcement, transparent financial environment, and strong individualism show less optimism in target prices. While our results corroborate the findings in earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that potential conflicts of interest contribute to biased research, we establish that there are institutional channels that mitigate analyst forecast bias.
We design both ex-ante and ex-post optimism measures to reflect the fact that analysts' target prices may be optimistic relative to the current and/or future stock prices. We benchmark target price against concurrent stock price to construct ex-ante measures, and against future stock prices to create expost measures. Our ex-ante measures include the implied return of the target price and its rank within industry, while our ex-post measures include whether and for how long the stock price has met the target price during the forecast horizon.
Our data allows us to identify a number of analyst attributes that are related to information advantage and potential conflicts of interest with the covered firms. In particular, we identify analysts who work for pure brokers, analysts who work for brokers that have previous investment banking ties with the covered firms, and analysts who reside in the same country as the covered firms. These analysts may provide less biased target price forecasts due to their information advantage arising from underwriting relationship and geographic proximity (e.g., Malloy 2005; Ke and Yu 2006; Bae, Stulz and Tan 2008) . These analysts, however, may also be subject to greater conflicts of interest, originating from both personal and business considerations. For example, an analyst may seek to maintain a good relationship with the target firm's management to generate underwriting business and to enhance his career opportunities. In fact, the literature on stock recommendations shows evidence that analysts who are employed by banks with business ties with the target firms tend to provide more optimistic recommendations. Thus we have a trade-off between the effect of information advantage and conflicts of interest on target price optimism; and the net impact of these two forces is an empirical question.
In addition to the classical conflicts of interest proxies described above, we also consider the impact of indirect investment banking pressure on target price optimism. Analysts may please firms that have greater needs of investment banking business with biased forecasts in earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and target prices (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2006) . Thus, we examine whether external financing needs induce target price optimism.
Our unique analyst location data allows us to associate the institutional infrastructure of the country in which an analyst reside with the forecast behaviour of the analyst. Following the law and finance literature, we investigate whether investor protection, legal enforcement, financial transparency, economic development and culture has any impact on target price optimism. On the one hand, due to strong investor protection, effective legal enforcement, and transparent information environment, analysts in countries with good institutional infrastructure would refrain from conflict-of-interest behaviours, since engaging in such activities would likely subject them to severe penalties. Penalty-avoidance thus suggests that analysts in these countries would provide less biased target price forecasts. On the other hand, however, countries with better institutional infrastructure usually have more developed financial markets.
Analysts in these countries face fiercer competition and may be more motivated to fulfill business mandates through biased forecasts. Since these two forces offset each other, the net impact of good institutional infrastructure on target price optimism is an empirical question.
Our results demonstrate that target price optimism exists for analysts working with underwriters, and in covering firms with high external financing needs. These results support a conflict-of-interest story, in which both direct and indirect investment banking pressures induce target price optimism.
Furthermore, we find that good institutional infrastructure mitigates analyst optimism, supporting the penalty-avoidance story. We contribute to the analyst forecast literature and the law and finance literature in the following important ways. First, we systematically examine the determinants of analyst optimism by constructing measures that capture different aspects of optimism in target price forecasts. Our paper adds to a growing literature of target price yet is distinct in examining target price optimism. Second, our unique analyst location data allows us to associate the institutional infrastructure of the country in which an analyst resides with the forecast behaviour of the analyst. Our results indicate the importance of institutional infrastructure in mitigating analyst forecast optimism. Thus, while individual analysts could be motivated toward biased research, country infrastructure offers, at least to some extent, some disciplining mechanisms. Finally, our sample includes firms and analysts from a wide array of developed and developing markets. The heterogeneous country characteristics and large coverage increase the generalizability of our results.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the related literature. Section II describes our data and various proxies for target price optimism. Section III conducts empirical analyses on the determinants of target price optimism. Section IV presents robustness checks, and Section V concludes.
I. Literature review
Financial analysts typically provide earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices in their research reports to convey their investment assessment of the covered firms. Although target price is one of the three major components of analysts' research output, much of the literature has focused on earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. It is only until recently that academic research has begun examining the determinants and investment value of target prices. Bandyopadhyay, Brown, and Richardson (1995) find that target price forecast revisions co-move with earnings forecast revisions. Bradshaw (2002) demonstrates that analysts issue target prices to support their stock recommendations. Brav and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) show that analysts' target prices have investment values incremental to their stock recommendations. Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2008) show that target price accuracy increases with the use of rigorous valuation techniques rather than a heuristic one, especially for analysts who are adept at accurate earnings forecasts. Huang, Mian, and Sankaraguruswamy (2009) find that portfolios based on changes in both consensus recommendations and target prices are more profitable than those based merely on changes in recommendations or target prices.
Da and Schaumburg (2011) document profitable trading strategies based on industry relative valuations implicit in analyst target prices, suggesting that the informativeness of target prices mainly derives from analysts' ability to assess the relative performance of stocks within a specific industry. Da, Hong, and Lee (2010) find that the investment value of target price derives from earnings forecasts and the implied discount rates embedded in the forecasts of P/E ratios.
While most studies conclude that target price is informative and value relevant, there also exists some doubts over the investment value of target prices. Bonini, Zanetti, Bianchini, and Salvi (2010) and Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2012) find that target price accuracy in Italy and the U.S., respectively, is limited and argue that the lack of accuracy is possibly due to the fact that target price forecasting is largely an unmonitored activity. Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2012) suggest that the ability of some analysts to provide accurate forecasts over time could simply reflect their persistent differences in forecast optimism.
Perhaps due to the lack of large sample data, few studies examine target prices in a cross-country context. Bonini et al. (2010) find that analyst target price forecasts are systematically biased by factors such as boldness, firm size, and market momentum in the Italian market. Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker (2012) report that analyst characteristics and affiliation affect accuracy, boldness, and revision frequency of target prices in 16 countries. Kerl (2011) finds that target price accuracy is negatively related to analyst optimism and firm risks in the German market. Since these papers examine analyst target prices in different regions and countries, their results are not directly comparable due to the use of different samples and the differences in institutional environment in which the firms and analysts are located. For example, Bilinski, Lyssimachou and Walker (2012) report that bank affiliation increases target price accuracy in their sample of 16 developed countries, while Kerl (2011) finds that such an affiliation has no effect on target price accuracy.
Our paper is closely related to studies that relate information advantage and conflicts of interest to analyst forecast performance. Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) find that analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings forecasts for firms in that country than non-resident analysts; moreover, the local analyst advantage is high in countries where earnings are smoothed more, less information is disclosed by firms, and firm idiosyncratic information explains a smaller fraction of stock returns. Chen and Martin (2011) report that analysts are more accurate after the underlying firms borrow from their affiliated banks.
The increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry, and for borrowers with bad news and high credit risk. Their results suggest that there is information spillover from commercial banking division to equity research division within financial conglomerates.
Duan, Hotchkiss, Jiao (2011) find that the selling by mutual funds whose families provide financial services to underlying firms' employee pension plans is more likely to be motivated by an information advantage than their buying, suggesting that mutual funds obtaining information advantages through pension business ties.
A large literature demonstrates analyst optimism in stock recommendations due to the underlying incentives on the part of either analysts or their employers. The evidence is mixed for earnings forecasts. Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007; and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008) , we examine whether different aspects of country-level institutional infrastructure such as investor protection, legal enforcement, financial environment transparency and individualism have any impact on target price optimism.
II. Data and Key Variables
In this section we describe our data sources, the sample criteria, and construction of various proxies for target price optimism. Table I describes our variables and data sources.
A. Sample
We begin our sample selection by identifying analysts' target price forecasts that are revisions to their own forecasts issued during one week to 12 months earlier based on the I/B/E/S price target detail file during 2002 -2011 , for both U.S. and non-U.S. firms. 5 From Compustat, we obtain daily stock prices, adjustment factor, market capitalization and annual financial data. We use the latest closing price within three days before the announcement date of an analyst's target price as the concurrent stock price and use it to compute the implied return of the target price. We adjust for discrepancy in the underlying currency between Compustat and I/B/E/S using the daily exchange rate from Compustat. We also obtain stock prices from the I/B/E/S monthly summary file to ensure the consistency in stock prices between
Compustat and the I/B/E/S. The closing dates for monthly stock prices from the I/B/E/S summary file fall usually in the middle of the month. We keep only those target price forecasts whose concurrent stock prices (after considering adjustment factor) from Compustat are within 70% to 400% of the monthly stock prices from the I/B/E/S. We find, however, that average (median) interval for target price forecast revision is 89 (71) days for our sample. Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the distribution of target price revision interval. We observe that most of the target prices are revised within 90 days of issuance (in fact, 61% of target prices in our sample have less-than-90-days revision interval). 10 In light of the traditional wisdom and the observed revision frequency, we choose six-month as the primary horizon to measure the target price optimism, and use 12-month horizon as a sensitivity check.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
An optimistic target price carries the connotation that the target price issued is higher than the current market price. Thus, a natural measure of optimism is the distance between target price (TP) and current stock price (P), TP2P, defined as TP/P -1. A larger value of TP2P indicates more target price optimism. TP2P is in essence the implied return of a firm within the forecast horizon estimated by an issuing analyst. This implied return measure is not adjusted, however, for potential risks associated with each stock. To ameliorate this concern, we make two adjustments. Our first adjustment follows the popular industry-adjusted return method in event studies. Specifically, we define TP2PRank as the rank of TP2P within its 2-digt-SIC industry in any given year. TP2PRank is coded between 0 and 99. 11 In our second adjustment, we remove country-industry return from TP2P. Specifically, we define TP2PAdj as TP2P minus the previous six-month cumulative average return of the firms from the same country and industry.
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TP2P, TP2Prank, and TP2PAdj are ex-ante measures of optimism; namely, the degree of optimism is revealed at the time of target price forecasts. We are also interested in how optimism is materialized ex-post during the forecast horizon. As previously discussed, we choose six months as target price horizon. If a target price is more optimistic ex-post, we would expect that (1) the target price is less 10 By target price "revision" we meant that the analyst either reiterates the previous target price or revises the previous target price to a different value. Only 4% of the sample observations are reiterations. Excluding reiterations barely changes the distribution of the revision interval. 11 To preserve country heterogeneity, we cannot rank TP2P by country in this measure, for otherwise all countries will have the same rank. 12 Some countries may have too few firms covered in Compustat to construct meaningful industry returns. Thus we use Fama-French 17-industry classification instead of 2-digit SIC codes to compute country-industry returns. When there are fewer than 5 firms for a country-industry, we use instead the global industry returns.
likely to be met during the next six months, and (2) the maximum price over the next six months is smaller than the target price. Correspondingly, we define Ratio6 as the percentage of trading days in the next six months that the stock price is lower than TP; and TPNOTMET as a dummy variable that equals one if the maximum stock price over the next six months is lower than TP, and zero otherwise.
TPNOTMET is an inverse measure of target price accuracy used in the literature (e.g., Bradshaw, Brown and Huang 2012) . We define Ratio12 similarly as Ratio6 but over a forecast horizon of 12 months. In untabulated results, we also consider 12-month horizon for TPNOTMET, and three-month horizon for both of the ex-post measures, and our conclusion remains qualitatively the same.
We notice that pessimistic target prices may be misclassified as optimistic with the TPNOTMET measure. This arises when a pessimistic, below-the-market-price target price is issued and the immediately subsequent stock price does not drop enough to be lower than the target price, even though in the future the stock price may drop below the target price. In this case, TPNOTMET will be coded as 1 (extremely optimistic) while it is in fact pessimistic. Note that this misclassification issue is completely caused by stock price not having enough time to react to target price issuance. To address this issue, we remove the first month or the first three months after the target price forecast date when we compute TPNOTMET and Ratio6. We find that our conclusions remain the same with these alternatives.
In sum, we consider the ex-ante optimism measures of TP2P, TP2Prank, and TP2PAdj, and the ex-post optimism measures of Ratio6, TPNOTMET and Ratio12. Table II The degree of optimism is similarly corroborated by TP2PAdj, which has a mean value of 0.15 that implies a half-year return adjustment of 0.04 to TP2P. Extrapolating that adjustment to full-year would mean an 11% of inflation in target price, if TP2P is indeed the implied return of 12 months.
Ex-post, over the six-month forecast horizon, a mean value of 72% for ratio6 indicates that more than 2/3 of the time the stock prices stay below the target prices during the next six months. The percentage of time that target price remains above the market price drops slightly to 67% over the next 12 months. TPNOTMET (i.e., dummy that target price is never met) has a mean value of 0.43, indicating that 43% of the target prices have never being met during the next six months. 13 These metrics indicate that optimism is non-trivial when we benchmark the target prices against the realized stock prices during the forecast horizon. Panel B of Table II shows If we treat positive implied returns as being optimistic and negative implied returns as being pessimistic, Figure 1 shows that analysts are much more likely to be optimistic than to be pessimistic. Table III shows the summary statistics of our final sample by country (Panel A) and by year (Panel B). The final sample includes firms from 53 countries, with the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and Japan being the top four countries with the largest number of firms. 14 The U.S and the U.K. are also the top two countries with the largest number of analysts in residence, followed by Canada, Korea, Japan, and France.
The countries with the highest TP2P are Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey, each with more than 30% of implied returns. Poland has the lowest TP2P, followed by New Zealand, Anguilla and Finland. The average TP2P across our sample countries is 19%. We note that the magnitude of target price optimism for our sample is consistent with what has been reported for individual countries in the literature. For example, in our sample of [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , TP2P for the U.S. has a mean of 0.20. Bradshaw, Brown and 13 In our regressions in which Ratio6 is dependent variable, we use the ordinary least squares technique. To address the large left-tail of Ratio6, we also consider converting Ratio6 to i) dummy variable and use logistic regressions, and ii) quartile, quintile, or decile ranking and use Tobit regressions. Our conclusions remain the same. We choose to use Ratio6 to emphasize that we use a continuous variable for ex-post optimism and to sufficiently differentiate it from TPNOTMET. 14 We do not report the summary statistics for eight countries without any analysts in residence. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we drop the 42 firms from these countries.
Huang (2012) report 0.24 for the U.S during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The somewhat lower TP2P in our sample is because the period of [2000] [2001] , which are not included in our sample, witnessed the largest value of TP2P in the sample of Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2012) .
Panel B of Table III Table III also show large variation of analyst optimism over the years.
To control for earnings forecast optimism, we obtain the nearest annual earnings forecast by the same analyst for the same firm within nine months of the target price issuance date from the I/B/E/S detail file 15
. We define earnings forecast optimism, optimism_eps, as (EPS Forecast Actual EPS)/Price.
The average optimism_eps in our sample is 28 basis points, which assuming 20 times of P/E, would translate into a 5.6% of price optimism. This amount is about half of the 10-12% of price optimism in TP2P reported earlier. The full-sample correlation between TP2P and optimism_eps is 0.050, and the average value of the correlations between those two variables across the same analyst is 0.052. These statistics illustrate that target price optimism is substantially different from earnings forecast optimism.
C. Analyst and Firm Traits
In this paper, we investigate whether optimism in target prices is affected by three sets of variables that are related to analyst, firm, and analyst-country traits.
Previous literature has documented that analysts are subject to conflicts of interest due to the related business and personal ties with the underlying firms in different contexts, although these ties may also bring analysts relative information advantage. We examine three analyst traits that are related to recommendations, and target prices. They further report that this relation is stronger for firms with equity offering. In addition, Teoh et al. (1998a Teoh et al. ( , 1998b report that firms manage accruals to increase earnings prior to financing activities of IPO and SEO. In this sense, firms may manage earnings to signal their financing needs. If external financing leads to optimism due to indirect investment banking pressures, so will earnings management. We thus expect target price optimism be positively related to the following firm traits: (change in equity and debt scaled by total assets),
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(change in equity scaled by total assets), and earnmgmt_firm (firm-level earnings management level computed as the absolute value of discretionary accruals from Modified Jones Model).
D. Analyst-country characteristics
We examine how the institutional framework of a country shapes the action of analysts, which in turn affects the forecast optimism of their target prices. We consider country characteristics that are closely related to three different aspects of a country's institutional infrastructure: investor protection and legal enforcement, financial transparency, and economic development and culture.
A country with strong investor protection and legal enforcement will likely impose higher costs on analysts' potential conflict-of-interest activities. We consider the legal origin, the efficiency and integrity of legal system (e.g., impartial courts, judicial independence), the quality of investor protection (e.g., corruption, expropriation, property rights), and control of self-dealing. These variables measure different aspects that an investor can be protected (or expropriated) by a country's legal system. Our second group of institutional characteristics concerns financial transparency of a country. Transparent financial system gives rise to more accurate information flow, which presumably reduces information uncertainty and target price optimism. We include the following financial transparency variables: index of accounting disclosure for a country from La Porta et al. (1998) , and index of country-level earnings management from Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) . Finally, to measure the economic development and cultural of a country, we use GDP per capita, a dummy variable indicating whether a country is a developed country, the fraction of a country's equity held by the U.S. investors, and individualism based on Hofstede's (2001) cultural index. Table I earlier lists and defines these country characteristics and cites their data sources. Overall, we hypothesize that better institutional features are associated with lower target price optimism.
E. Univariate Comparison of Target Price Optimism
Table IV presents a univariate comparison of target price optimism conditioning on the analyst, firm and country traits. For analyst and firm traits, we partition the sample into two groups based on the median value of the variable for every analyst-country and year. For analyst-country characteristic variables (other than binary variables), we partition the sample into two groups based on the median value of the variable for our sample countries for every year. Briefly, we make a number of observations. First, optimism is positively associated with analyst traits of underwriter and local, suggesting that conflicts of interest dominate information advantage when underwriter analysts and local analysts set their target prices. Optimism is significantly positively associated with firms' financing-related variables of and , and to a lesser degree with earnmgmt_firm.. In contrast, good country-level institutional infrastructure generally helps reduce optimism: Better investor protection and legal enforcement, higher financial transparency, and higher individualism are associated with lower optimism. Overall, Table IV provides preliminary evidence that some analyst and firm traits, as well as analyst-country characteristics affect target price optimism.
III. The Determinants of Target Price Optimism

A. Benchmark Regressions
In this section, we examine the determinants of target price optimism in a multivariate regression framework. We control for firm and analyst characteristics that previous literature has shown to affect analyst performance. 18 Our controls for firm characteristics include firm size (logmv), market-to-book (mb), firm revenue growth (revt_growth), intangible assets (intangible), the number of analysts that cover the firm (nanalyst), stock turnover (turnoverpre12) and return standard deviation (retstd12) over the previous year. The analyst characteristics include earnings forecast optimism (optimism_eps), firm experience (firmex), general experience (genex), number of firms covered by the analyst (nticker), and the size of the brokerage house (brsize). Since target price is frequently updated, we control for the extent of target price revision from the previous target price (∆TP2TP) and the cumulative stock return during the target-price revision period (return_rev). Finally, we add the previous 12-month cumulative ACWI world-index return (ACWI12), since the average degree of optimism could be correlated with the overall stock market movement in the past 19 . We control additionally for time and industry effects by including forecast year, month and industry indicator variables. We adjust standard errors for two-way clustering at the firm and year levels to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Our regression model takes the following general form:
where the dependent variable is a proxy for target price optimism. All regressions are in OLS except for TPNOTMET as dependent variable, in which case we use logistic regression. All the variables are defined in Table I . In Equation (1), we suppress subscripts with the understanding that each of the observations involves analyst i's target price forecast on firm j at day t. The independent variables are measured using information up to the forecast date.
18 Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2012) use firm size and price standard deviation in their study of target price accuracy in the US, and Bonini et al. (2012) add return momentum to the Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2012) specification. Clement (1999) shows that earnings forecast accuracy is related to analyst characteristics. 19 The ACWI index reflects the value-weighted average market returns across both emerging and developed markets around the world. The data is downloaded from the Morgan Stanley website.
Panel A of Table V reports Among the firm characteristics, we first note from Panel A of Table V that firm size is positively associated with ex-post optimism measures of Ratio6, TPNOTMET, and Ratio12 (Columns (2), (5) and (6)). This finding is consistent with Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2012) , who report that size is negatively related to forecast accuracy. However, firm size is negatively associated with the ex-ante optimism measures of TP2P, TP2Prank and TP2PAdj. Since the difference between the ex-ante and the ex-post optimism measures lies in the scaling stock price, one potential explanation for this discrepancy is that the result is driven by the differing association between size and the stock price scalar ex-ante and expost of target price issuance. We find that this is indeed the case. For the ex-post measures, the correlation between firm size and the inverse of stock price at the end of six month after target price issuance date is only -0.04, whereas for the ex-ante measures, the correlation between firm size and the inverse of concurrent stock price is -0.35. The much increased negative correlation of the scalar effect in the ex-ante measures leads to a negative coefficient on firm size in Columns (1), (3) and (4). [Insert Table V about here.]
Among other firm characteristics variables, we find that analysts are less optimistic on stocks with high market-to-book ratio and stocks with more analyst following, but are more optimistic on stocks with high recent revenue growth. The coefficient on ∆TP2TP is significantly positive, while the coefficient on return_rev is significantly negative. As expected, optimism in earnings forecasts is positively related to both ex-ante and ex-post target price optimism. Analysts with longer forecasting experience is more optimistic, while those working with larger brokerage house are less optimistic.
Consistent with Figure 2 , the overall past 12-month market return ACWI12 is negatively related to ex-ante optimism in Columns (1), (3) and (4). However, possibly due to the long-run price reversal over one and a half to five years (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) , the past 12-month market return becomes positively related to ex-post optimism in Columns (2), (5) and (6). There is no consistent sign for other analyst and firm traits in the determinants of target price optimism. In sum, Panel A of Table V indicates that our optimism measures are related to a number of analyst and firm characteristics and recent stock price movement.
B. The Impact of Conflicts of Interest, External Financing, and Country Characteristics on Optimism
As previously discussed, we are interested in the association between target price optimism and analyst traits that are related to conflicts of interest, firm traits that are related to external financing, and three categories of analyst-country characteristics -investor protection and legal enforcement, financial transparency, and economic development and culture. Since many of these characteristics are highly correlated, we add each trait one at a time to the benchmark regression in equation (1) to avoid confounding effects:
where denotes an analyst, firm or country characteristic that we are interested in. We include all of the controls in Equation (1) and is the vector of coefficients for those controls. Table V . We also note that in Table IV , we have presented the univariate comparison of target price optimism based on these traits. It should be pointed out that the coefficient on the Trait variable in Equation (2) essentially captures the same effect as those of the univariate results, with the difference being that Equation (2) is estimated with continuous variables where applicable and with controls.
Panel B of
Let us discuss the results on analyst traits first. There is no consistent sign on the coefficient of purebroker, although there are two out of six optimism measures for which the coefficient on purebroker is significantly positive. Thus the impact of conflicts of interest on target price optimism seem to be offset by that of the information advantage for analysts working with pure brokers. In contrast, the coefficient on underwriter is reliably positive and significant across all of the optimism measures, indicating that analysts employed by the target firms' underwriters and co-managers issue overly optimistic target prices, consistent with the conflicts of interest hypothesis.
The coefficient on local is significantly positive in for three out of six optimism measures. A deeper look at local analysts yields some interesting results. We partition local analysts further into those hired by foreign brokers (expatriate local) and those hired by local brokers (pure local), and create a dummy variable for each type of local analysts denoted as expalocal and purelocal, respectively. We find that the coefficient on expalocal is negative and significant for fiveout of the six optimism measures, whereas purelocal is positive and significantly for five of the six optimism measures. These results suggest that pure locals are more subject to conflicts of interest, perhaps due to the pressure of local social network. Collectively, the effects of these two types of local analysts offset each other, rendering the aggregated effect of local to be inconsistent. Overall, however, the results with these analyst traits suggest that the impact of conflicts of interest dominate that of information advantage.
Turning to financing-related firm traits, we find that both and are significantly positively related to target price optimism. Thus, consistent with Bradshaw et al. (2006) , external financing needs plays a role in elevating analyst optimism. The coefficient on earnmgmt_firm is also significantly positive, indicating that analysts are more optimistic for firms with more earnings management. Collectively, these results suggest that indirect investment banking pressures, as evidenced by firms' external financing needs, induces target price optimism.
Having shown that conflicts of interest may exacerbate analyst optimism, we now turn to examine the impact of institutional characteristics on target price optimism. Within investor protection and legal enforcement category we include legal origin (commonlaw), the overall score of legal system and property rights (legsys), the efficiency and integrity of legal enforcement (rule, judicial, judimp, and judindp), and various measurement and control of investor protection including corruption in government (corruption), Protection of property rights (propprot), and an index that measures the legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders (anti-dealing). A high value in these variables indicates stronger investor protection and more effective legal enforcement. We find that the coefficients on the above traits are all negative. Except for three cases in commonlaw, two cases in rule, one case in corruption and one case in propprot, the coefficients on these traits are also statistically significant. Thus we have strong evidence that investor protection and legal enforcement of a country discipline analysts from issuing overly optimistic target price forecasts.
Turning to financial transparency of a country, we include an index of accounting disclosure for publicly listed firm in a country (disclosure), and an index of country-level earnings management (earnmgmt). We find that forecast optimism is inversely related to the degree of accounting disclosure, and positively related to the degree of country-level earnings management. Since more accounting disclosure and lower level of a country's earnings management indicate more financial transparency, these results overall suggest that financial transparency reduces analyst optimism in target prices.
Finally, we turn to proxies for economic development and cultural of a country. We find that the coefficients on GDP per capita (gdpp) is inconsistent is sign and not significant in any of the regressions, while the coefficients on the dummy indicating a developed country (developed) is negative and significant in four out of six regressions. The variable usholdgdp measures U.S. investors' overseas holding of equity in a country scaled by local market GDP. It captures the economic openness of and foreign investors' interest in a country. The coefficients on usholdgdp are negative and significant in four out of six regressions. Since developed countries usually have more established investor protection and effective legal enforcement, the mixed findings on economic development is interesting: they suggest that it is good institutional infrastructure rather than degree of wealth that discipline analysts from providing overly optimistic target price forecasts. For the cultural variable of individualism (IDV), we observe that it is significantly negatively associated with optimism in five out of six specifications.
In sum, the results in Panel B of Table V suggest that analysts' conflicts of interest lead to target price optimism. However, good institutional infrastructure of a country such as strong investor protection and legal enforcement, transparent financial environment, and high individualism could discourage analysts from liberally inflating target prices. The evidence suggests that the institutional infrastructure of a country could play a vital role in disciplining analysts from biased research.
IV. Robustness Checks
A. Subsample of Firms Covered by Both Local and Foreign Analysts
A sharper focus of the institutional mediating effects would be to isolate the covered firms so that one could better differentiate whether optimism across analysts is indeed induced by institutional features of a country in which the analysts are domiciled. Implicitly, local (foreign) analysts are subject to local (foreign) laws and rules, since rules and law are more enforceable to residing citizens. To this end, we create a subsample of firms that are covered by both local and foreign analysts. This subsample leaves us about half of the observations. 
B. Mediating Effects at the Firm-Analyst-Year Level
In our previous regressions, we pool all observations together. Although we use two-way cluster adjustment of standard errors at the firm and year levels, our results may still tilt towards analysts who provide more forecasts during the year for each firm. To address this concern, we collapse the observations by the mean values of the variables to the firm-analyst-year level, which allows only one observation per analyst per firm-year. Doing so reduces the number of observations from the full sample observations of 1,129,974 to 422,436 observations; in other words, each analyst on average issues three target prices per year for a firm. We report the regression results for our two main proxies of optimism in Panel B of Table VI . We find that the results on the mediating effects of analyst, firm and analyst-country traits are qualitatively the same as those of the full sample in Panel B of Table V . Thus, our conclusions that conflicts of interest exacerbate optimism while good institutional infrastructure mitigates optimism remain unchanged for the firm-analyst-year sample.
C. Subsample of Non-US Analysts
Our full sample is dominated by U.S. analysts, who provide roughly one third of target price forecasts. To examine whether our results are merely driven by U.S. analysts, we remove U.S. analysts from the sample and examine the subsample of non-US analysts only. In untabulated results, we find that the main inferences are qualitatively the same as those of the full sample. We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by U.S. analysts.
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D. Subsamples of Buy, Hold, and Sell
In this subsection, we restrict our sample to those analysts who issue both target prices and stock recommendations within nine months. In tiered stock recommendations, buy recommendations are more common and tend to be viewed as over-optimistic. Requiring non-missing stock recommendations reduces the sample size by 16%. In this reduced sample, buy ("Buy" and "Strong Buy" recommendations), hold, and sell (the "Sell" and "Strong sell") recommendations each accounts for, respectively, 49%, 39%, and 12% of the total observations, consistent with the previous literature in that sell recommendations are less common.
We separately examine mediating effects for the buy, hold and sell subsamples for our two main proxies of optimism (TP2P and Ratio6) in Panel A of Table VII . We make a few observations. For analyst traits, the coefficient on purebroker is significantly positive only in the sell subsample. It is even significantly negative for the buy subsample in the regression of TP2P. This interesting result suggests that pure broker analysts may provide inflated target prices despite their pessimistic stock recommendations. The coefficient on underwriter is significant and positive for buy and hold subsamples, but not for sell subsample. There is no difference in target price optimism between pure locals and expatriate locals for the sell sample. For the firm traits, the coefficients on ∆XFIN and ∆EQUITY are significant and positive for both buy and hold subsamples, while those on earnmgmt_firm are significant and positive for one out of the two optimism measures for the three subsamples. Overall, the positive association between conflicts of interest and target price optimism is stronger in the situation when analysts have non-sell recommendations. This could be due to the fact that there are fewer investment banking opportunities in the "sell" firms, and thus less incentive for analysts to issue overly favorable target prices. [INSERT TABLE VII HERE.] For the country-level traits, we find that for commonlaw and earnmgmt, the mitigating effect on target price optimism is only restricted to the sell subsample. We observe that the negative association between proxies for good institutional infrastructure and target price optimism is stronger for the sell subsample and weaker for the buy subsample, especially for the ex-post optimism measure of ratio6. We note that this last result is due to variable construct of the buy sample-therein the target prices are too optimistic for ratio6 to have a meaningful dispersion. The mean of ratio6 for sell, hold, and buy samples are, respectively 0.43, 0.66 and 0.82. In the buy sample, the median of ratio6 is at the upper bound value of 1. When we create a dummy variable indicating whether ratio6 equal to one, and replace OLS regression with logistic regression for the buy sample, the regression results would remain qualitative the same as for the full sample for the country institutional infrastructure variables. Overall, we conclude that the country mitigating effects remain for buy, hold and sell sub-samples.
E. The Recent Financial Crisis
In Panel B of Table VII , we consider the impact of recent financial crisis on target price optimism. We partition the sample into crisis period and non-crisis periods, where the crisis period is based on the NBER recession period of December 2007 to June 2009. Except for purelocal, rule, and corruption, overall, our conclusions regarding conflicts of interest and good institutional infrastructure as characterised by strong investor protection, effective legal enforcement and transparent financial environment remain qualitatively the same for both non-crisis and crisis periods. Interestingly, the coefficients on developed, usholdgdp and idv are negative and significant only in non-crisis period.
V. Conclusion
Using a unique analyst-location data that include 11,663 analysts from 45 countries covering 17,353 firms, we examine the impacts of analyst, firm and country characteristics on target price optimism. We propose both ex-ante and ex-post optimism measures that capture the implied return of the target price and whether or for how long the target price is met over the forecast horizon. We identify local analysts and analysts that are affiliated with underwriters, two properties that are implicative of both conflicts of interest and information advantage. We find evidence that conflicts of interest dominate information advantage in analysts' issuance of target prices. Consistent with these results, we find that firms with greater external financing needs induce more analyst optimism, suggesting the big impact of indirect investment banking pressures on analyst forecast behaviour.
We examine how the institutional framework of a country shapes the forecasting behaviour of analysts, which in turn affects the optimism of their target prices. We consider country characteristics that are closely related to three different aspects of a country's institutional infrastructure: investor protection and legal enforcement, financial transparency, and economic development and culture. We find that analyst optimism is attenuated by good institutional infrastructure of a country. Our results suggest that country-level institutional infrastructure is important in disciplining analysts from inflating target prices.
In sum, our study suggest that analyst optimism in target prices is exacerbated by conflicts of interest and investment banking pressures but is mediated by country-level institutional infrastructure. These results should be of interests to investors and policy makers who are interested in the battle against biased research. 
Table I Variable Definitions
This table describes variables used in the analyses. We obtain analyst related data from the I/B/E/S, and financial and stock trading data from Compustat, unless specified otherwise. We winsorize continuous variables at the one and 99 percentiles over the full sample.
Variable
Definition and data source
Dependent variables
Ex-ante optimism measures TP2P
The implied return of target price relative to current price, computed as (TP/P 1 ) TP2PRank
The rank of TP2P, coded from 0 to 99, within its 2-digit SIC code industry in any given year
TP2PAdj
The implied return of target price adjusted for the average return for the portfolio of firms from the same country and Fama-French 17 industry Ex-post optimism measures Ratio6
The percentage of trading days in the next six months that stock prices are less than TP TPNOTMET Dummy equal to one if the maximum stock price over the next six months is smaller than TP
Ratio12
The percentage of trading days in the next 12 months that stock prices are less than TP
Control variables logmv
The logarithm of market cap as the product between the stock price and shares outstanding.
Mb
The market to book ratio of a firm revt_growth The annual growth of total revenues over the past 5 years. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) . The measure is equal to change in equity plus change in debt.
∆EQUITY
Change in equity following Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) . It is computed as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock minus cash dividends paid, scaled by total assets. earnmgmt_firm Firm-level earnings management level, measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones Model.
Country characteristics commonlaw
A dummy variable equal to one if the legal origin of a country is common law, and zero otherwise. The raw data are from La Porta et al. (1998) . judicial Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms" produced by the country-risk rating agency Business International
Corporation. The data are from La Porta et al. (1998) . Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing from Djankov, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . disclosure Index of accounting disclosure for a country. The data are from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) . Table I . All of the models include year, month, and industry indicators. We report t-statistics adjusted for two-way clustering at both firm and year levels in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. (-3.73 ) (-9 .79) (-3.16 ) (-3 .11) (-1 (-6 .98) (-2.27 ) (-7 .76) (-2.14) (-8.07 ) (-3.28 ) (-5.42 ) (-1.82 (-3.43 ) (-2 .69) (0.18) (0.40) (-0 .60) (-0 .51) (-1.56 ) (-0.35 ) (0.10) (-0.32) 
Panel A. Benchmark Regressions
